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Iran After the Elections
Just hours after polls closed on June 12, the Guardian 
Council announced that in the Iranian Presidential 
election: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won an 
astonishing 62% of the vote. Shortly after that, the 
major thoroughfares of Iran filled with demonstrators 
and 30 years of grievance poured into the streets. 
These are the protests that will finally effect significant 
change in the Islamic Republic, the result of a sense of 
panic within the regime that appears to have led to the 
manufacturing of electoral results on a massive scale. 
A full analysis of the results is not yet possible, but a 
preliminary academic study of the official results has 
shown that turnout in some provinces topped 100%, 
and that in a third of all provinces Ahmadinejad would 
have had to claim up to 44% of all former reformist 
voters in addition to sweeping the board with former 
conservative and former centrist voters.1 
The protests that have resulted are the next and perhaps 
most difficult stage of a century of mass movements 
geared toward bringing democratic principles to Iran 
and reigning in the clerical elites’ domination of power 
in Iran. From the 1906 Constitutional Revolution to 
the removal of the Qajar dynasty in the mid-1920s, 
the nationalist uprising of the early-1950s, the 1979 
Revolution and all the way through to the 1999 student 
demonstrations, Iranian resistance has been a consistent 
struggle to take Iran’s governance out of the hands 
of the few and into the hands of the many. At each 
stage, the overriding objective has been to create a 
government that is accountable to its people. 
Under the Islamic Republic in particular, the decreasing 
value placed on public opinion and participation in 
government decisions has been transparent. In the 
weeks ahead of the 2009 election, years of discontent 
with this control was fomented in the public rallies of 
Mousavi’s ‘green campaign’ and the openness of the 
Presidential debates. People on both sides of the political 
spectrum suddenly got into the long-suppressed habit 
of making their views known publicly. It was never 
going to be easy to put an abrupt halt to such freedom 
of expression once the votes had been cast.
1 Ali Ansari, Daniel Berman and Thomas Rintoul, 
“Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 
Presidential Election”, Chatham House and the Institute of 
Iranian Studies, University of St Andrews, 21 June 2009
The campaign platforms, which were dominated not 
only by the obvious economic issues but also by civil 
rights, have subsequently continued on the streets. 
Discontent on issues of gender discrimination, judicial 
transparency, paramilitary intrusion, international 
isolation, and religious control have combined with a 
highly questionable election result to trigger levels of 
anger and social unrest not seen since the revolution. 
The Supreme Leader himself has been openly defied for 
the first time ever, not only by the people on the streets 
but also a select few establishment elites.  With an 
economy facing heights of inflation and unemployment, 
a government that responds to protests with force and 
by imposing further limitations on social freedoms is 
likely to face an increasing number of Iranians with 
little to lose and everything to gain from agitating 
for change. 
What remains to be seen is how exactly this system 
will be changed. That will depend on the opposition’s 
continued defiance as well as the public and persistent 
support of some establishment elites. The people’s 
opposition since the election has been coupled with 
vocal demands that Mir Hossein Mousavi publicly 
support the opposition and stand by them as they call 
for change. He is being thrust into the role of opposition 
leader and many believe that a significant reason he 
has embraced this position is his religio-feminist wife, 
Dr. Zahra Rahnavard. Formerly an establishment figure, 
since the election Mousavi has definitively sided with 
the opposition on two points: that the election results 
were questionable and that people have a right to 
peacefully protest. His support must persist and broaden 
if any semblance of coherence is to remain on the side 
of the opposition. 
It is now clear that the Islamic Republic is in the midst 
of a final showdown within its once relatively cohesive 
but now factionalized establishment. Ever since the 
attempts at reform of the late 1990s, the establishment 
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had become divided along one significant line: whether 
or not to open the Iranian system. Back then, so-called 
reformists claimed they sought better international 
relations and a loosening of strict moral controls. But 
when the 1999 student demonstrations brought all 
the problems to a head, then-President Khatami failed 
to support the people and the myth of reform was 
debunked. 
By the time of the 2008 parliamentary elections the 
conservatives further split into “principlists” who 
adhere to the fundamental principles of the Khomeini 
doctrine and “moderate conservatives” who agreed with 
the Khomeini doctrine but sought revisions to reflect 
contemporary changes in domestic and international 
politics. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad 
led the principlist camp. Former President Ayatollah 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and former top nuclear 
negotiator Ali Larijani led the moderate conservatives. 
Rafsanjani and Larijani have echoed Mousavi’s discontent 
but not openly supported the opposition public and 
their protests. Larijani, now Speaker of Parliament, has 
twice since the election added his voice to the opposition 
stance, denouncing paramilitary attacks on dormitories 
at Tehran University and criticizing the Supreme Leader 
for “taking sides” during his definitive Friday prayer 
speech, a week to the day following the election. 
Rafsanjani, the current head of the Assembly of Experts 
which has the power to appoint or remove the Supreme 
Leader, was more outspoken ahead of the election when 
he wrote an open letter to Khamenei warning that “You 
can stop the bubbling of a spring with just a shovel, 
but when the water gathers up, you can’t stop it with 
any amount of force”, a reference to Ahmadinejad’s 
statements against him in the pre-election debates. Post-
election, his voice can be heard through his family - his 
daughter Faezeh’s brief detention during a protest in 
Tehran, just days after the Supreme Leader announced 
that all demonstrations are prohibited, was a clear 
statement of warning by the establishment. 
The initial objective of the alliance of moderate 
conservatives and the old reformists was to oust 
Ahmadinejad. But the days before and after the election 
hints at something further: a distinct inclination toward 
weakening the Supreme Leadership itself.  As incoming 
Professor of International Relations at LSE Fawaz Gerges 
noted last week, the ruling mullahs are swimming 
against the dominant current of Iranian society. In 
fact, there are already reports of a possibility that 
behind the scenes, Rafsanjani and the Assembly of 
Experts are seriously discussing changes to the Supreme 
Leadership – not eliminating it but opening it up to a 
Supreme Leadership council of elders which would 
include Khamenei but remove his singular powers. 
Further changes that could take place pertain to the 
powerful Guardian Council – the 12-member mostly 
clerical body wherein half of the members are directly 
appointed by the Supreme Leader and the other half 
indirectly appointed by him. The Council is best known 
for its role in vetting political candidates for elections 
in Iran and there is a possibility that its powers could 
be reduced. 
These two changes alone would make a significant 
difference in opening up the Islamic Republic system 
to a rule of governance that is less centralized. This 
might be enough to satisfy the protesters, as their 
primary objective is less to instantly eliminate the 
Islamic Republic than to change it in such a way that 
opens it up to further improvements by the people. 
As hundreds of opposition leaders, journalists and 
backers continue to be arrested and killed in the streets, 
and establishment elites call for martyrdom in the 
opposition struggle, for the first time ever, the cracks 
in the establishment are now wide enough for the 
world to see. Even more remarkable is that this time 
the protesters aren’t only students – they are older 
Iranians who participated in the 1979 Revolution, they 
are the families of war martyrs who never could have 
imagined they’d rise in fury against the Islamic Republic, 
they are civil servants and homemakers, businessmen 
and women, people of all ages and all backgrounds. 
As the street protests continue to be quashed, there 
is a growing possibility of general strikes, including 
amongst civil servants and possibly even the Bazaar 
itself, all of which would further unite the Iranian 
people toward effecting change.
As the establishment’s legitimacy continues to dissipate, 
its only weapon is the long-standing Iranian suspicion 
of the Western threat. President Obama has led 
Western governments in remaining disengaged from 
the details of the election itself, instead focusing on 
firmly supporting the rights of peaceful demonstrators 
and admonishing violence against them. In contrast 
to his predecessor, he has successfully avoided giving 
the Iranian establishment an opportunity to prove that 
the United States is interfering in its affairs, thereby 
weakening it. 
The Islamic Republic as it stood before June 12, 2009 
is no longer. What comes next will undoubtedly be 
better for the Iranian people, it is now a matter of 
when and how much. 
